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My proposed legislation. . .calls upon the Congress to delegate
significant new negotiating authorities to the executive branch. For
several decades now, both the Congress and the President have
recognized that trade policy is one field in which such delegations
are indispensable…the questions which remain concern the degree
of delegation which is appropriate and the conditions under which
it should be carried out.
President Richard M. Nixon1
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 2015, President Barack Obama signed legislation
to reauthorize the Trade Promotion Authority (“TPA”) and the
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of

1
Richard M. Nixon, President, Special Message to the Congress Proposing Trade
Reform Legislation (Apr. 10, 1973), available at American Presidency Project,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3800.
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2015 (“TPA-2015” or “the Legislation”), about two and a half
months after the bills were introduced in the House and the Senate,
and eight years after they expired in 2007.2 On June 24, 2015, the
Legislation passed the House by a vote of 218 to 206, and
subsequently the Senate, sixty to thirty-eight, with thirteen
Democrats joining all but five Republicans.3 The TPA, previously
known as “fast-track authority” until it was renamed in 2002, refers
to “[the] authority of the U.S. president to negotiate international
agreements that Congress can approve or disapprove, but not
amend or filibuster.”4 It re-establishes an expedited legislative
process for presidents to submit trade deals to Congress. The TPA
was last renewed under the Trade Act of 2002 during the George W.
Bush Administration.5 Until it expired on July 1, 2007, eleven Free
Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) had been implemented during the
tenure of a Republican president and a Democratic president.6
2

David Nakamura, In Bipartisan Ceremony, Obama Signs Trade Legislation, Calls for
WASHINGTON
POST
(June
29,
2015),
Infrastructure
Bill,
THE
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/29/in-bipartisanceremony-obama-signs-trade-legislation-calls-for-infrastructure-bill;
Bipartisan
Congressional Trade Priorities And Accountability, Pub L. 114-26 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 4201-4210 (2016)) (referred to as TPA-2015); see also H.R. 1890, 114th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2015); S. 995, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015). See Press Release, United States Senate
Comm. on Fin., Hatch, Wyden and Ryan Introduce Trade Promotion Authority
Legislation
(Apr.
16,
2015)
available
at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=7701eb50-a0ef4257-bfc1-b06efe725b8c; Jonathan Weisman, Deal Reached on Fast-Track Authority for
Obama on Trade Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/business/obama-trade-legislation-fast-trackauthority-trans-pacific-partnership.html?_r=0 (announcing that “key congressional
leaders” agreed to give President Obama trade promotional authority and outlining
the consequences of passing the new bill).
3
Jonathan Weisman, Trade Authority Bill Wins Final Approval in Senate, N.Y. TIMES
(June 24, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/business/tradepact-senate-vote-obama.html?_r=0.
4
John Remensperger, What’s the Deal with Fast-Track Authority?, UNC CTR. FOR
MEDIA L. & POL’Y (Feb. 7, 2014), https://medialaw.unc.edu/2014/02/whats-the-dealwith-fast-track-authority/ (explaining the potential effect of fast-track authority in
future trade negotiations).
5
Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3805 (2002) (referred to as the “2002
Trade Act”). The Trade Promotion Authority in the 2002 Act is found in its Title XXI
under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority. See Trade Act of 2002, H.R. 3009,
107th Cong. § 2101(a) (2002).
6
See NICHOLAS BAYNE & STEPHEN WOOLCOCK, THE NEW ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY:
DECISION-MAKING AND NEGOTIATION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 50 (3d ed.
2012) (explaining that the TPA was given out “reluctantly,” and President Obama does
not have it at all, since it ran out in 2007). This Article adopts the official World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) definition of PTAs, but the PTAs are also commonly referred to
as Free Trade Agreements and Regional Free Trade Agreements (“RTAs”). See generally,
Scope
of
RTAs,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
available
at
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Despite its historical status, reviving the TPA has been more
controversial and difficult in recent years; for example, a bill to
renew the expired TPA was introduced in January 2014, but it never
became law.7 Fifteen months later, the 114th Congress was faced
with the choice of whether the TPA is a “Genie in the Lamp” that
must be kept bottled up, or whether it should be renwed in order
to facilitate the negotiation and the implementation of pending
Preferential Trade Agreements. From an administrative law point of
view, the important consideration was if Congress chose to renew
the TPA, what should it do to ensure that its delegation to the
executive branch is properly accounted for, including securing the
congressional role in ever evolving U.S. trade policy.
This Article proceeds under the premise that the renewal of the
TPA was a necessary legislative decision for securing congressional
involvement in the trade negotiation process, and for successfully
concluding pending trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (“TPP”) and the bilateral trade agreement with the
European Union, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (“TTIP”). Part I.A provides a brief overview of the
doctrinal framework of the TPA, and its constitutional basis as a
unique political mechanism in the United States. Part I.B illustrates
the significance of the TPA in the context of trade negotiations, and
differentiates the procedural versus substantive aspects of the TPA.

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/scope_rta_e.htm (last visited May 18,
2016) (defining RTAs as reciprocal trade agreements between two or more partners,
including free trade agreements and customs unions). See IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33743, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) AND THE ROLE OF
CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 21 (2015) (listing negotiations concluded under TPA granted
under the Trade Act of 2002, which are: the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Chile
(2003); Singapore (2003); Australia (2004); Morocco (2004); [Bahrain (2004)];
Dominican Republic-Central America (2005); Monaco (2006); Peru (2007); Colombia
(2011); Korea (2011); and Panama (2011)). Of these eleven, the three FTAs enacted
after 2007—Colombia, South Korea, and Panama—were signed before the expiry date
under the George W. Bush administration, although President Obama enacted them
into law. See also DAVID M. OLSON, Multilateral Negotiations in American Trade Policy:
Free Trade Agreements from Bush to Obama, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND
DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE INTERMESTIC POLITICS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION 49, 65 (Oluf
Langhelle ed., 1st ed. 2014) (describing the Obama Administration’s actions to
“renegotiate . . . pending agreements (Panama, South Korea, and Colombia) to be able
to submit them for congressional approval”).
7
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2014 (“BCTPA”), H.R. 3830,
113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2013); see Press Release, United States Senate Comm. on Fin.,
Baucus, Hatch, Camp Unveil Bill to Bring Home Job-Creating Trade Agreements (Jan.
9, 2014), http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=7cd1c18887f1-4a0b-8856-3fc139121ca9 (explaining the purpose and significance of the TPA
legislation).
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Part II explains how the TPA evolved in U.S. trade policy since it was
first introduced as the fast-track authority. This historical account
will show that the TPA, as a congressional-executive agreement,
requires Congress’s watch over how the president exercises the
delegated power by revisiting the political situation that demanded
the institution of procedural requirements in the 1970s, standards
that became the foundation of the modern TPA. Part III engages in
an in-depth analysis of the congressional oversight mechanisms of
the TPA, examining its evolution from the Trade Act of 2002 to the
recent TPA-2015. Here, the new procedural requirements and
legislative tools implemented in the TPA-2015 are described, and
their merits, such as ensuring democratic but efficient engagement
with the executive branch, are evaluated.
Shifting gears, Part IV navigates potential limitations and
administrative law concerns regarding the TPA from a judicial point
of view. This Part contemplates a scenario in which the executive
branch breaches the procedural requirements prescribed by the TPA,
and whether Congress would be able to resort to appropriate
judicial remedies in a court of law. Finally, the Article concludes by
emphasizing that the new administration, whichever it may be
upon the presidential election in November 2016, should ensure an
inter-branch cooperation between Congress and the executive
branch in exercising the TPA authority, in order to provide
transparency and accountability, which the TPA-2015 has set out to
do.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TPA
A. What is the TPA?
The TPA is a political mechanism through which Congress
delegates its authority to the president for the purpose of negotiating
and entering into certain PTAs.8 Through an expedited set of
legislative procedures, and in conjunction with extensive
congressional consultations, the president can submit trade
agreements to Congress for an up-or-down vote.9 In exchange for
8
See infra Part I.B for an in-depth description of the TPA (outlining the source
and inception of fast-track authority).
9
J.F. HORNBACK & WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33743, TRADE
PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 1 (2011); Trade
Promotion
Authority
(TPA):
What
is
TPA?
COAL.
SERV.
INDUS.
https://servicescoalition.org/services-issues/trade-promotion-authority-tpa (last visited
May 18, 2016) (“TPA helps create a strategic framework for U.S. trade policy and
establishes a critical relationship between the President and Congress in order to
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this authority, the executive branch is required to provide various
notices, consultations, and reports to Congress on the progress of a
trade agreement under negotiation, to ensure Congress’s influence
over such agreements.10 Throughout this Article, these procedures
will collectively be referred to as “congressional oversight
mechanisms.”11 As an ex-ante congressional-executive agreement,
the TPA creates a symbiotic relationship within both branches’
constitutionally vested authorities. 12 Indeed, it is a creative and
practical political compact between the president and Congress,
designed to adapt to the increasingly complex nature of PTA
negotiations.13
i. Significance of the TPA vis-à-vis Trade Negotiations
In the sphere of trade agreement negotiations, the TPA is often
viewed as a necessary tool for enhancing the United States’
credibility when its representatives sit at a negotiation table with
their counterparts. In the context of trade diplomacy, the following
expectations exist: (1) that the United States would be able to
guarantee the negotiated terms that were discussed at a negotiating
table, and (2) that the final agreements will be given timely and

pursue trade negotiations.”).
10
COAL. SERV. INDUS., supra note 9; see generally, White House Fact Sheet: Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Office of the United States Trade Rep. (June
2013),
available
at
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/factsheets/2013/june/wh-ttip; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (hereinafter 2007 GAO
REPORT), GAO-08-59, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: AN ANALYSIS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND
CONGRESSIONAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR CONSULTATIONS UNDER TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY
33 (2007).
11
See infra Part I.A. for further discussion on the significance of congressional
oversight in the context of TPA.
12
See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & R. CHUCK MASON, Congressional Oversight and Related
Issues Concerning International Security Agreements Concluded by the United States, in
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: AN OVERVIEW, A MANUAL AND SELECT DEVELOPMENTS 189, 192
(2010) (explaining that Congressional authorization takes the form of a statute passed
by a majority of both Houses of Congress unlike treaties, where only the Senate plays
a role in authorization). For an overview of the political context in which the TPA was
born, see generally, I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS (4th ed. 2005) (describing
political reasons and factors behind U.S. trade policy for the past fifty years, and
recounting how fast-track authority evolved over time).
13
In the international trade world, the phenomenon of countries engaging in
complex chains of various PTAs has been described as the “Spaghetti Bowl Effect,”
first coined by Professor Jagdish Bhagwati. See generally Jagish N. Bhagwati, U.S. Trade
Policy: The Infatuation with FTAs 4-9 (Colum. Univ. Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper,
Paper Series No. 726), available at http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:15619
(1995) (describing problems with preferential trading arrangements, such as
increasing “arbitrary and nonsensical” operation of trade policies).
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unamended consideration.14 Especially in complex plurilateral
trade negotiations, any withdrawal from, or amendment of,
concessions promised by a member state can upset its negotiation
efforts. President Obama and the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (“USTR”) have publicly spoken on the importance
of the TPA for concluding ambitious PTAs that are currently under
negotiations.15 As of April 2016, the closest conclusion on the
horizon is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”), which intends to
expand trade and investment with eleven other countries in the
Asia-Pacific area. While the TPP was signed on February 4, 2016,
after more than five years of negotiations, it has not yet entered into
force. Other major trade agreements under discussion include the
TTIP with the European Union (“E.U.”), which recently concluded
its twelfth round of negotiation, and the Trade in Services Agreement
(“TISA”), a proposed international trade treaty among twenty-three
parties with an aim of liberalizing the worldwide trade of services,
such as banking, health care, and transport.16 In spite of the
14

See What is Fast Track? Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., available at
http://clinton2.nara.gov/Initiatives/FastTrack/what.html (last visited May 18, 2016)
(“[U]ltimately, fast track gives the President credibility to negotiate tough trade deals,
while ensuring Congress a central role before, during and after negotiations.”).
Supporters of the TPA legislation include private sector and trade associations,
including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Farm Bureau Federation,
Boeing, Pfizer, and Walmart. Such major corporations have aggressively lobbied for
the authority to be granted, since the last TPA bill was introduced in January 2014. See,
e.g., Brian Wingfield et al., Congressional Deal Reached on Obama Trade-Talks Authority,
BLOOMBERG
(Jan.
9,
2014),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-0109/congressional-deal-reached-on-obama-trade-negotiating-powers (explaining that a
coalition of approximately 160 groups support the legislation).
15
See, e.g., Michael Froman, Ambassador and U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks
at the U.S. Conference of Mayors (Jan. 21, 2015) (“America has always been strongest
when it speaks with one voice, and that’s exactly what Trade Promotion Authority, or
TPA, helps us to do.”).
16
Trade policy experts have opined on how the role and timing of the TPA would
be crucial for the passage and implementation of the TPP. See, e.g., IAN F. FERGUSSON
ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42694, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP)
NEGOTIATIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 50 (2015). Press Release, Office of the United
States Trade Rep., Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministers’ Statement (Feb. 4, 2016),
available
at
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2016/February/TPP-Ministers-Statement. The twelfth round of the TTIP
negotiations was conducted from February 22-26, 2016 in Brussels, Belgium, focusing
on market access, regulatory cooperation, and rules issues. See Ignacio Garcia Bercero,
E.U. Chief Negotiator, Statement by the EU Chief Negotiator on the 12th TTIP
Negotiation Round, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/154325.htm.
For discussion of previous presidents’ and the private sector’s views of the TPA’s
advantages, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules:
Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J. L. & POLITICS
345, 345–346 (2003) (explaining that President George W. Bush and President Bill
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unpredictable political climate, when the United States further
engages in the TTIP and the TISA, former Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice stated that the TPA will remain “a critical tool in
the conduct of U.S. diplomacy.”17
ii. Substantive vs. Procedural Aspects of the TPA
Trade agreements are often criticized for their impact on
sensitive political and economic issues in the U.S. domestic sphere,
such as labor and the environment. As such, the TPA has most
frequently been debated on the substantive matters of Congress’s
negotiating objectives.18 For many, the TPA-2015 discussion
revolves around the expanded scope of its non-traditional trade
negotiating objectives, such as currency manipulation and the StateOwned and State-Controlled Enterprises.19 While it is difficult to
separate the TPA dialogue into a binary of substantive versus
procedural issues, this Article focuses on the procedural aspects,
namely the congressional oversight mechanisms that will drive the
conversation on the degree of accountability that should be required
of the executive branch. In its design, these oversight mechanisms
will ensure that the executive branch does not receive a “carte
Clinton both set the TPA as their top legislative priorities for free trade agreements).
See also Jasmin Farrier, CONGRESSIONAL AMBIVALENCE: THE POLITICAL BURDENS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 85 (2010) (citing President Nixon’s Special Message to the
Congress Proposing Trade Reform Legislation in April 1973: “[F]or several decades
now, both the Congress and the President have recognized that trade policy is one field
in which such delegations are indispensable.”). Trade in Services Agreement, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REP., available at https://ustr.gov/TiSA (summarizing the
launch of the TISA and its likely financial impact in the services trade) (last visited May
18, 2016).
17
See Condoleezza Rice, Give Obama Trade-Promotion Authority, THE WASHINGTON
POST (June 5, 2015), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/restoreamericas-standing-through-trade/2015/06/05/4a28af42-0b77-11e5-95fd-d580f1c5d
44e_story.html.
18
See, e.g., Eli J. Kirschner, Fast Track Authority and Its Implication for Labor Protection
in Free Trade Agreements, 44 Cornell INT’L L.J. 385, 394 (asserting that “perhaps the most
important tool that Congress has for controlling the contents of trade agreements
negotiated under fast track authority is its ability to set negotiating objectives within
the TPA legislation”).
19
A famous example of how a negotiating objective can thwart renewal of fasttrack authority is illustrated in President Bill Clinton’s inclusion of labor and
environmental issues in side agreements to North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”). See C. O’Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements:
Why the NAFTA Turned into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L & ECON. 2 (1994). See also,
Alisa DiCaprio, Are Labor Provisions Protectionist?: Evidence from Nine-Labor-Augmented
U.S. Trade Agreements, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (arguing that the inclusion of “nontrade” provisions like labor and environment were one of the main reasons that the
fast-track legislation lapsed for an extended period from 1994 until 2002).
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blanche” delegation.20 As this Article examines more closely in Part
III below, the TPA-2015 arguably enhanced the congressional rein
over the executive branch’s exercise of the delegated authority
through the new consultation and reporting requirements.
B. Doctrinal Framework for the TPA: Presidential and
Congressional Powers
As Hal Shapiro has noted, the TPA is “a peculiarly American
institution, reflecting the unique challenge of making trade policy
in a system where power is divided between the Executive and
Legislative Branches.”21 Indeed, the TPA is a unique compromise
and solution to a decades-old debate between Congress and the
executive branch on how best to carry out the United States’
international trade policy objectives through means of trade
agreements. This is in sharp contrast to most of the United States’
foreign counterparts, where approval of trade agreements is fairly
straightforward, especially in countries with a parliamentary
governance system, which is led by the prime minister, the leader of
the majority party in the legislature. For example, in Canada, the
ratification process is wholly controlled by the executive, although
Parliament has had an ad hoc involvement, which is not
constitutionally mandated.22
To understand why the TPA is an inherently fragile political
compact, examining its constitutional basis is helpful. As is well
known, the separation of powers is a fundamental political doctrine
embodied in the Constitution, which confers different powers to the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the U.S. government.
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution grants the president exclusive
authority to negotiate international agreements and treaties, and to
conduct foreign affairs. 23 When the president negotiates a trade
agreement that requires changes in U.S. tariffs or other domestic
laws, however, such agreement is subject to approval by the Senate’s

20
See Hal Shapiro & Natalie R. Minster, Fast Track Procedures: Do They Infringe Upon
Congressional Constitutional Rights?, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL’Y 107 (1995).
21
HAL SHAPIRO, FAST TRACK: A LEGAL, HISTORICAL, AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 92 (2006).
22
Laura Barnett, Canada’s Approach to the Treaty-Making Process, PARL. OF CANADA
(Nov 6, 2012), available at http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications
/2008-45-e.htm#a6.
23
See JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL97-896, WHY CERTAIN TRADE
AGREEMENTS ARE APPROVED AS CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN AS
TREATIES 1 n.1 (2010) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 319
(1936)).
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two-thirds super majority vote.24 As for Congress, Article I, Section
8, Clauses 1 and 3 of the Constitution give exclusive power to set
tariffs, to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and to enact
other legislation governing international trade.25 An interesting
caveat to this authority is that this express power can be delegated
to the president.26
This institutional flexibility creates an
opportunity for the Congress to consider congressional-executive
agreements, as opposed to Article II treaties, allowing for interbranch cooperation in the form of the TPA without depriving either
branch of its constitutionally enumerated powers.27
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TPA: FROM FAST-TRACK AUTHORITY TO THE
TPA
A. Inception of Fast-Track Authority: A Political Tug-of-War
For the first 150 years of the United States’ existence, Congress
used its power over foreign trade to set tariff rates on all imported
The Constitution permits this practice, as the
products.28
establishment of tariff rates was more a function of domestic tax
policy rather than foreign affairs, based in large part on Congress’s
power to regulate foreign commerce and the conventional treatment
of trade legislation as a bill for raising revenue.29 However, two
legislative events occurred in the 1930s that dramatically changed
the contours of U.S. trade policy. As a result of these occurrences,
the fast-track authority was born.
At the outset of the Great Depression, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act of 1930 established prohibitively high tariff rates in response to
U.S. producers seeking protection.30 As a remedial measure,
24

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cls. 1 & 3.
26
See DESTLER, supra note 12, at 2 n.2.
27
There has been lively scholarly debate on whether congressional-executive
agreements are more advantageous than treaties. See John Yoo, Rational Treaties: Article
II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
2, 2–4 (arguing that treaties and congressional-executive agreements have different
“trade-offs” that “make one or the other better suited for different types of pacts”).
28
FERGUSSON, supra note 6, at 2.
29
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cls. 1 & 2 (establishing the power of the Congress, which
includes: “power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imports and excises[;]” and, power to
“regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”).
30
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1352 (2016) (enacted on June 17,
1930). While economists debate possible causes for the Great Depression, the SmootHawley tariff certainly played an important role. See, e.g., Bill Krist, Did the SmootHawley Tariff Cause the Great Depression? AM. TRADE POL’Y (June 16, 2014), available at
http://americastradepolicy.com/did-the-smoot-hawley-tariff-cause-the-great25
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Congress developed and enacted the Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act of 1934 (“1934 Trade Act”), which authorized President
Franklin D. Roosevelt to enter into reciprocal trade agreements and
reduce tariffs within pre-approved levels. This was the first time
Congress granted the president power to negotiate bilateral trade
agreements without receiving prior congressional approval.31 Some
argue that the 1934 Trade Act signified Congress’s aim to lessen the
political pressure from special interests it often faced.32 Whether or
not that was the intention of Congress, what is clear is that from its
inception, fast-track authority has been contentious due to its fragile
nature as a political compact between the Administration, the
House, and the Senate, requiring a significant “give-and-take” by
and between these three groups. This concern is evidenced by a
statement by Representative Allen Treadway of Massachusetts, the
ranking Republican on the Ways and Means Committee at the time,
who opposed the 1934 Trade Act: “[Congress] would surrender [its]
taxing power to the President and his subordinates in violation of
both the letter and spirit of the Constitution.”33 To this day, the
concern of balancing the authority of the executive and the
legislative branch remains highly relevant in every subsequent fasttrack renewal discussion.
B. Historical Concerns over Presidential Abuse of Fast-Track
Authority
Presidents seeking fast-track authority from Congress have
underscored its necessity to successfully conclude international
trade negotiations for the benefit of Americans. For instance, under
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, President John F. Kennedy was
granted fast-track authority for five years for the negotiation of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) that aimed to
reduce and eliminate tariff walls, which he called “the best
protection possible . . . for our American consumers.”34 When
depression/#.VU27e0v0-Ns (“Today, the Smoot-Hawley tariffs represent a cautionary
tale.”).
31
19 U.S.C. § 1351 (2016) (enacted on Jun. 12, 1934). The Reciprocal Trade
Agreement Act of 1934, U.S. HOUSE OF REP. HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES,
http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/36918 (last visited May 5, 2015).
32
DESTLER, supra note 12, at 14–15.
33
HORNBACK & COOPER, supra note 9 (adding that to assuage such concerns, the
bill leading to the Trade Act of 1934 was amended with a three-year expiration date on
all trade agreements).
34
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1801 (2016) (referred to as the “1962
Trade Expansion Act”); John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Remarks Upon
Signing the 1962 Trade Expansion Act (Oct. 11, 1962), available at
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asking Congress for fast-track authority, President Kennedy sought
“two basic kinds of tariff-cutting authority”: (1) “[g]eneral authority
to reduce tariffs by 50 percent—including negotiations on broad
categories of products—in exchange for concessions from other
nations”; and (2) “special authority to reduce or eliminate all tariffs
on those products where the United States and the Common Market
nations dominate world trade.”35
In retrospect, some scholars have observed that in the effort to
implement multilateral agreements, the series of fast-track
extensions resulted in the “pendulum in the arena of international
trade [t]o sw[i]ng toward the President,” going beyond the topics
covered by the congressional trade agreements authority.36 For
example, President Kennedy entered into agreements in two areas
related to non-tariff barriers (“NTBs”), namely the GATT Antidumping Code that would have required changes in U.S. antidumping practices, and an agreement requiring U.S. customs
valuation to eliminate the American Selling Price method of pricing
products at the border.37 Such action arguably undermined the
limitations imposed by the sunset provisions within the 1962 Trade
Expansion Act. While the Kennedy Round, as it was called,
successfully concluded on June 30, 1967, the last day before the
expiration of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, Congress did not renew
the authority for seven subsequent years, as it was concerned over
“presidential encroachment on its legislative authority.”38

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8946.
35
Morris K. Udall, Congressman’s Report: The Trade Expansion Act of 1962: A Bold
New Instrument of American Policy (May 17, 1962), available at
http://www.library.arizona.edu/exhibits/udall/congrept/87th/620517.html.
36
Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to Beyond,
29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 687, 698 (1996).
37
Carrier, supra note 36, at 697. See also Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls
on Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
1,191, 1,195 (1986); I.M. DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION 6 (1997).
38
For discussion on the importance of sunset provisions within fast-track
authority, see infra Part III; see John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249, 253–54 (1967) (noting that
the GATT was not submitted to the Senate to be ratified); WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33743, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) AND THE ROLE OF
CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 4 (2014); see also John Jackson et al., Implementing the Tokyo
Round: Legal Aspects of Changing International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REV. 267, 346–
51 (1982) (observing that the reason for the unwillingness of Congress to grant the
president advance authority to negotiate, accept, and implement the new trade
agreements stemmed from addressing the “increasingly troublesome [NTBs] in the
GATT negotiations”); see also Koh, supra note 37, at 1,194 n.10.
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C. Creation of Modern Fast-Track Authority: the Trade Act of
1974
The result of the Kennedy Round became the precursor to the
creation of fast-track authority in the Trade Act of 1974 (the “1974
Trade Act”), which expanded the congressional role in defining
terms for allowing expedited legislative procedures.39 The 1974
Trade Act provided President Nixon with authority to negotiate the
NTBs, such as government procurement practices, customs
regulations, and rules for administering anti-dumping (“AD”) and
countervailing duty (“CVD”) procedures, as well as the U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences (“GSP”) for a 5-year Tokyo
Round of GATT through January 2, 1980.40 The original fast-track
processes that the 1974 Trade Act instituted became the foundation
for the current TPA. Notably, section 151 the 1974 Trade Act (19
U.S.C. § 2191) strengthened congressional oversight by
implementing the following key features.
i. Implementation of Procedural Requirements
The 1974 Trade Act incorporated procedural requirements that
the executive branch must follow, such as briefing and consulting
congressional committees and private-sector advisory committees
during the course of the negotiations, as well as giving advance
notice of the president’s intention to conclude an agreement before
entering into it.41 With respect to the briefing requirement, the 1974
Trade Act stated that the USTR is required to keep official advisers
of the Committee on Ways and Means or the Finance Committee
(“congressional advisers”) currently informed on matters affecting
the trade policy and with respect to possible agreements:
negotiating objectives, the status of negotiations in progress, and the
nature of any changes in domestic law or the administration thereof
which may be recommended to Congress to carry out any trade
agreement or any requirement of, amendment to, or recommendation
under, such agreement.42

39

19 U.S.C. §§ 2010–2476 (2016) (referred to as the “1974 Trade Act”).
DEANNA TANNER OKUN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF TRADE AGREEMENTS: EFFECT OF THE
TOYKO ROUND, U.S.-ISRAEL FTA, U.S.-CANADA FTA, NAFTA, AND THE URUGUAY ROUND ON
THE U.S. ECONOMY 8 (2003).
41
E.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2152 (2016) (Advice from Departments and Other Sources);
Id. § 2155 (Advice from Private Sector); Id. § 2212 (Transmission of Agreements to
Congress). DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION, supra note 37, at 7 (explaining
that in 1974, the agreement to which fast-track authority applied was the recently
initiated multilateral Tokyo Round for GATT).
42
19 U.S.C. § 2211 (b)(1)-(3) (2016).
40
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ii. Establishment of Timeline.
Second, the 1974 Trade Act included a deadline date for
conclusion of the agreements to which fast-track authority
applied.43 In addition to the briefing requirement, Congress
required the executive branch to notify congress ninety calendar
days before signing an agreement.44 Another essential requirement
was to establish a timetable resulting in an expedited vote by each
chamber of Congress within sixty legislative days with no
amendments allowed.45 As will be shown later in this Article, this
timeline requirement has become more sophisticated with different
notification requirements.
iii. Substantive Monitoring Requirement.
Furthermore, Congress implemented the monitoring and
consultation component by requiring the USTR to consult with the
Ways and Means Committee in the House, and the Senate Finance
Committee and other appropriate committees, on a “continuing
basis,” on the “development, implementation, and administration
of overall trade policy,” including, but not limited to, the following
elements of such policy:
• The principal multilateral and bilateral negotiating
objectives and the progress being made toward their
achievement;
• The implementation, administration, and effectiveness of
recently concluded multilateral and bilateral trade
agreements and resolution of trade disputes;
• The actions taken, and proposed to be taken, under the
trade laws of the United States and the effectiveness, or
anticipated effectiveness, of such actions in achieving trade
policy objectives; and
• The important developments and issues in other areas of
trade for which there must be developed a proper policy
response.46
Furthermore, the 1974 Trade Act included rules concerning
presidential submission of the negotiated agreement to Congress,
combined with the draft of a proposed implementing bill and

43

DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION, supra note 37, at 8.
19 U.S.C. § 2112 (e)(1) (2016).
45
DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION, supra note 37, at 8 (emphasis
added).
46
19 U.S.C. § 2211 (c) (1)-(4) (2016).
44
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supporting documentation as would be specified in the authorizing
legislation.
iv. Guarantee of Agreed upon Content; Up-Or-DownVote.
Finally, the 1974 Trade Act created expedited legislative
procedures which limited debate, especially in the Senate. When
the president formally introduced the implementing bill to both
houses of Congress, Congress would either approve or disapprove
on the day the president submitted it, in the form in which it was
presented to Congress, with the language unamended. This
procedural requirement, commonly referred to as the “up-or-down
vote,” became the crux of fast-track authority.47
While the expedited legislative procedures have not changed
since first enacted in 1974, how Congress built upon the safeguard
measures first introduced in the Trade Act of 1974 in recent forms
of the TPA remains highly relevant.48 Part III examines the evolution
of the congressional oversight mechanism in the 2002 Trade Act, the
predecessor to the recently passed TPA-2015, and highlights
noteworthy procedural changes.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: BEYOND THE 2002 TRADE ACT
This Part compares and contrasts the 2002 Trade Act, the last
legislation that extended the TPA, with the new TPA mechanism
introduced by the TPA-2015. With an overview of the significance
of oversight features in Part III.A, Parts III. B and C revisit the
effectiveness of the congressional oversight embedded in the 2002
Trade Act. Part III.D discusses the merits of the new elements in the
TPA-2015, and offers a comment on potential concerns arising from
the procedural enforcement as well.

47
Procedurally, this guarantee of an “up-or-down vote” on the implementation of
legislation is seen as the real advantage of fast-track for the president. See Steve
Charnovitz, Fast-Track: A Legal, Historical, and Political Analysis, J. INT’L ECON. L. 10(1)
153, 155–56 (book review) (agreeing with Hal Shapiro that “fast-track prevents
Congress from amending an agreement, from filibustering it, from bottling it up in
committee, or from otherwise engaging in delaying or other tactics to frustrate an upor-down vote”).
48
FERGUSSON, supra note 6, at 5 (stating that the initial grant of fast track trade
negotiating authority and the authority to enact tariff modifications by proclamation
under the 1974 Trade Act were in effect for five years until January 2, 1980).
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A. Principles and Purpose of Congressional Oversight in the
Context of the TPA
For the purposes of this discussion, the term “congressional
oversight,” encompasses “the review, monitoring, and supervision”
of the president and the USTR’s trade negotiation activities.49 The
philosophical underpinning for congressional oversight is found in
the Constitution’s mechanism of checks and balances among the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches. As James Madison
famously stated in The Federalist, “The structure of the Government
must furnish the proper checks and balances between the different
departments,” and must establish “subordinate distributions of
power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several
offices in such a manner that each may be a check on the other.”50
There are several overlapping objectives and purposes that
congressional oversight ideally serves:
• improving the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of
governmental operations;
• detecting and preventing poor administration, waste,
abuse, arbitrary and capricious behavior, or illegal and
unconstitutional conduct;
• protecting civil liberties and constitutional rights;
• inform the general public and ensure the executive policies
reflect the public interest;
• ensure administrative compliance with legislative intent; and
• prevent executive encroachment on legislative authority and
prerogatives.51
The draft version of this Article had argued Congress must find
effective ways to hold the executive branch accountable for the
delegated authority by balancing oversight and accountability—
achieving the objectives emphasized above—with practicality—
ensuring the executive branch complies with the requirements for
receiving the TPA. Part III.D illustrates the textual development of
congressional oversight, which failed to translate into the effective
implementation required in the 2002 Trade Act. The TPA-2015 will
be available to the incoming president with the inauguration
scheduled in January 2017. Accordingly, the new president and his
49
See L. ELAINE HALCHIN & FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL797-936,
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 1, 2 (2012).
50
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
51
See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41079, CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2010) (listing ideal objectives and purposes of
congressional oversight) (emphasis added); HALCHIN & KAISER, supra note 49, at 2.
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or her executive branch must work with Congress to adopt the new
procedural requirements of the TPA-2015, to ensure the political
compact stays effective and relevant in defining the U.S. trade policy
for the next decade.
B. Political Context of the 2002 Trade Act
Although the primary focus of the 2002 Trade Act was not the
procedural improvement of increasing congressional oversight
provisions, congressional oversight remained vital to the discussion.
When President George W. Bush sought to renew fast-track
authority—which was renamed “Trade Promotion Authority”—
Congress recognized that if it were to grant the TPA, it must be
coupled with proper congressional oversight, and “hold executive
officials accountable for the implementation of delegated
authority.”52 Such quid-pro-quo arrangement was necessary, as “the
real power of TPA is the underlying political compact between
Congress and the President rather than its statutory guarantees,
which are technically quite fragile.”53 In crafting the TPA, Congress
drafted the following provisions that can limit the use of the
expedited procedures. As shown below, they serve as important
checks to the delegated authority, so Congress would not simply
surrender its constitutional authority over trade-related matters, as
it has seen in the past.
C. The TPA under the 2002 Act: Expansion of Congressional
Oversight – Was it Effective?
The TPA under the 2002 Trade Act enhanced the congressional
oversight provisions in two significant ways. First, the legislation
introduced the new requirement of executive-congressional
consultations. It strengthened congressional clout by requiring that
a schedule and guidelines for consultations include the president
sending notification and seeking consultation with Congress before
beginning negotiations.54 It created a new Congressional Oversight
Group (“COG”), a body tasked with leading consultations with the
Administration and formulating the consultation guidelines.55 This
52

OLESZEK, supra note 51, at 1.
See Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as
Fast Track: Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More than a Name Change, 35
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 1 (2003).
54
H.R. 3009, 107th Cong., § 2107 (2d Sess., 2002) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3807
(2006)).
55
Id. § 2104 (a)–(f) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3804 (2006)) (Most of the
requirements for notification and consultation in the 2002 Trade Act are found in this
53
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group is jointly led by the chairmen of the revenue committees,
namely the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee, replacing the “congressional advisers” formerly
introduced in the 1974 Trade Act.56
Second, the new legislation provided more detailed
requirements from the executive branch, especially the USTR, while
negotiating directly with foreign governments:
• the USTR must “consult closely and on a timely basis with,
and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the
Congressional Oversight Group;” and
• the USTR must identify domestic laws that would be
affected by a trade agreement resulting from the
negotiations to the COG.57
Despite these progressive changes to the congressional
oversight mechanisms, the degree of their implementation remains
questionable at best. While the 2002 Trade Act preserved most of
the withdrawal mechanisms that had previously been in effect in the
1974 Trade Act, which in theory, should have allowed Congress to
deny fast-track treatment if the “president fails to comply with
certain required procedural steps,” the political reality makes it
extremely difficult for Congress to actually exercise these extreme
provisions.58
i. The GAO Report
The 2007 Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) Report
to the Senate Finance Committee accurately presents the need to
improve the content and process of congressional and private sector
consultations.59 The GAO Report showed that from August 2002 to
April 2007, the USTR held 1,605 consultations with congressional
committee staff. Contrary to what one would expect from the high
volume of consultation, the responses showed that satisfaction with
section.).
56
DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION, supra note 37, at 8.
57
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVES, About Us, http://www.ustr.gov/aboutus (last visited April 22, 2016). H.R. 3009, 107th Cong., § 2102(d)(1) (2d Sess., 2002)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3802(d)(1) (2006)) (“Consultations with congressional
advisers”).
58
HAL SHAPIRO, FAST TRACK: A LEGAL, HISTORICAL, AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note
21, at 25 (explaining that while the 2002 Trade Act provisions make fast-track an easily
retractable mechanism from a technical standpoint, in practice, its efficacy derives from
the underlying political compact between Congress and the president).
59
2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 41 n.60 (“Of 28 committee staffs (from
seven committees of jurisdiction in each House, each with a majority and minority
staff) that we contacted, we were able to secure interviews with individuals from 18.”).

KIM FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY

8/23/2016 11:12 PM

335

input and influence was “mixed.”60
1. Quality of Consultation
Although the committee staff the GAO interviewed said that
“USTR provided high-quality information that provided them with
insight into the progress of the negotiations” and demonstrated
“willingness to answer questions and follow up on particular issues
of interest,” the staff felt that the USTR’s consultation meetings had
not met their expectations “because they had not provided an
opportunity for a two-way exchange of information that the staff
considered a true consultation.”61 Some members of Congress,
especially committee chairs of the trade advisory committee, have
also expressed dissatisfaction with the executive branch’s execution
of the trade negotiation and consultation process, which were
required under the TPA in the 2002 Trade Act.62 In fact, more than
half believed “the consultation did not provide the opportunity for
meaningful input or influence into trade negotiations.”63
2. Timeliness of Consultation
With respect to the timing of the consultations, most, but not
all, of the staff of the trade and agriculture committees said the
timelines of consultations were good; however, staff from the other
committees of jurisdiction often said that “the consultations were
not timely.”64
3. Shortcomings of the COG
The COG, which was a new creation under the 2002 Trade Act,
was not perceived as particularly successful, according to the 2007
GAO Report. The intention of the COG was to draw members of
Congress into the consultation process, particularly members from
non-trade committees, and to provide them with a private and
confidential opportunity to have a consultative and advisory role in

60

See the 2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 57.
The 2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 43.
62
The 2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 57 (reporting that some chairs
expressed dissatisfaction with the feedback from the USTR, explaining that they
thought the USTR was either biased against their committee or that their opinions were
not truly valued or taken into consideration); see also, Inside Trade, “Grassley Presses
USTR to Improve Consultations on FTAs,” WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Jul. 7, 2006); 2007 GAO
REPORT, supra note 10, at 21.
63
See 2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.
64
2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 44.
61
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trade policy.65 According to the USTR consultation log, the “COG
was convened only nine times before TPA lapsed in July 2007,” and
worse yet, most staff outside of the trade and agriculture committees
were unfamiliar with, or unaware of, the COG, and those staff who
knew the COG “did not find it to be useful.”66
There are two possible explanations for such dissatisfaction
among congressional staff and committee members. The first is that
the TPA did not include enough oversight mechanisms in the text of
the 2002 Trade Act. The second, and the more likely reason based
on the 2007 GAO Report, is that while the provisions were
adequately written on paper, the problem lies in their
implementation. TPA-2015 attempts to address the first concern by
including further oversight and consultation requirements in the
Legislation. The second concern, however, can only be addressed
when the executive branch works with Congress, and is subject to
future reviews. Meanwhile, Part III.D explores how TPA-2015 has
improved.
D. TPA-2015: Improved Congressional Oversight, Consultations,
and Access to Information
TPA-2015 expands on the 2002 Trade Act’s efforts to secure
greater congressional oversight mechanisms. TPA-2015 provides
more safeguards in various stages of the trade negotiations process,
which require more from both the president and the executive
branch. Specifically, it attempts to expand access to information
and requests greater accountability to supplement the meager
consultations and coordination efforts that existed under the 2002
Trade Act.
TPA-2015’s emphasis on enhanced consultation requirements
is clear from the language in its preamble.67 The preamble of the
Bill, S. 995, in part, reads: “A BILL to establish congressional trade
negotiating objectives and enhance consultation requirements for trade
negotiations, to provide for consideration of trade agreements, and
for other purposes.”68 Furthermore, the name of the Legislation
added the word “accountability,” which shows Congress’s belief
65
2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 (citing a congressional staff familiar with
the creation of the COG).
66
2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 46-47.
67
Jonathan Law & Elizabeth A. Martin, A Dictionary of Law, OXFORDREFERENCE.COM
(7th
ed.
2014),
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/
9780199551248.001.0001/acref-9780199551248-e-2955?rskey=Br6pqc&result=3115
(defining “preamble” as “The part of a statute that sets out its purposes and effects.”).
68
See H.R. 1890, S. 995, 114th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 2015) (emphasis added).
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that it is a crucial factor in gaining bipartisan support.69
Among the eleven sections in TPA-2015, four sections are
particularly noteworthy for their discussion of congressional
oversight. Section 4202 outlines “Trade agreements authority”;
section 4203 provides for “Congressional oversight, consultations,
and access to information”; section 4204 imposes increased
“Notice, consultations, and reports”; and section 4205 lays out
“Implementation of trade agreements.”70
I will discuss
improvements to congressional involvement under each of these
sections.
i. Section 4202: Trade Agreements Authority71
This section permits the president, subject to congressional
notification requirements and certain limitations, to enter into trade
agreements with foreign countries to modify duties or other import
restrictions that unduly burden U.S. trade before July 1, 2018 (or
July 1, 2021 if the trade authorities procedures are extended), and to
make changes to duties the president determines to be required or
appropriate to carry out such trade agreements.72 Importantly, this
section gives teeth to the trade authorities procedures, as it
establishes the process to gain an extension that the president must
complete, as well as the procedure by which either house of
Congress can deny the president’s request for an extension of the
TPA authority.73 This procedure is a reminder to the executive
branch that the availability of the expedited procedures is “a
congressional prerogative” that can be withdrawn if Congress
becomes dissatisfied with how the president has conducted trade
agreement negotiations.74
ii. Section 4203: Congressional Oversight, Consultations,
and Access to Information75
This section provides detailed requirements that the

69
Compare Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2014, H.R. 3830, 113th
Cong. § 1 (2014), with Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability
Act of 2015, H.R. 1890, 114 Cong. 1st Sess. §1 (2015).
70
19 U.S.C. § 4202 (2016); 19 U.S.C. § 4203 (2016); 19 U.S.C. § 4204 (2016);
19 U.S.C. § 4205 (2016).
71
19 U.S.C. § 4202 (2016).
72
Id. § 4202(a)(1)(A)-(B).
73
Id. § 4202 (a)(5)(A)-(D).
74
FERGUSSON, supra note 6, at 14.
75
19 U.S.C. § 4203 (2016).

KIM FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

338

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

8/23/2016 11:12 PM

[Vol. 40:2

administration must follow in its consultations with Congress.76 It
specifies that in the course of trade negotiations, the USTR shall:
“meet upon request with any member of Congress”; provide access
to pertinent documents, including classified materials, to any
member of Congress who requests them; and engage in close and
timely consultation with the Senate Finance Committee, the House
Ways and Means Committee, the House and Senate Advisory
Groups on Negotiations, all committees of the House and the
Senate with jurisdiction over laws that could be affected by the trade
agreement, and the House and Senate Committees on Agriculture
concerning negotiations and agreements relating to agricultural
trade.77
Also, this section promotes enhanced coordination with
Congress through the production of written guidelines by the USTR
that require that office to share important information with
concerned members of Congress and affected federal agencies. The
USTR must develop these guidelines in consultation with the
chairmen and the ranking members of the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee respectively, within
120 days after TPA-2015 is enacted, which was October 27, 2015.78
In accordance with this requirement, the USTR produced its
“Guidelines for Consultation and Engagement.”79 Additionally, in
the course of trade negotiations, the USTR must also consult closely
and on a timely basis with these congressional advisers, keeping
them “fully apprised of the measures a trading partner has taken to
comply with those provisions of the agreement,” before their entry
into force.80
In terms of access to information, the greatest improvement
under TPA-2015 is making the “pertinent documents” related to
negotiations, including “classified information,” available to
congressional staff, in addition to members of Congress, under the
condition they receive proper security clearances as needed.81 In this
regard, the USTR Consultation Guidelines specify that it will make
U.S. text proposals and consolidated text available to the following
76

Id. § 4203(a)(1).
Id. § 4203(a)(1)(A)-(E).
78
Id. § 4203(a)(3)(A) (providing for written guidelines to promote enhanced
coordination with Congress).
79
U.S.T.R., Guidelines for Consultation and Engagement (Oct. 27, 2015), available at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR%20Guidelines%20for%20Consultation%20
and%20Engagement.pdf [hereinafter “USTR Consultation Guidelines”].
80
Id. § 4203(a)(2) (2016).
81
Id. § 4203(a)(3)(B)(ii).
77
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individuals:
• all members of Congress;
• relevant professional staff of the Committees on Finance
and Ways and Means with an appropriate security
clearance;
• professional committee staff with an appropriate security
clearance from other committees interested in reviewing
text relevant to the committee’s jurisdiction;
• any personal office staffer with an appropriate clearance of
a member of the Committees on Finance and Ways and
Means; and
• any personal office staffer with an appropriate security
clearance accompanying his or her Member of Congress.82
iii. Section 4204: Notice, Consultations, and Reports83
Notably, the notice requirement has become more rigorous
under TPA-2015: the president is required to give at least ninety days
notice before initiating negotiations with a country, in addition to
providing written notice to Congress of the president’s intention to
enter into the negotiations, the specific U.S. objectives for the
negotiations with that country, and whether the president intends
to seek an agreement or changes to an existing agreement.84
Furthermore, the Legislation allows congressional advisory groups
to compel meetings “upon the request of a majority of the members
of either the House Advisory Group on Negotiations or the Senate
Advisory Group on Negotiations” before initiating the negotiations
or at any other time concerning the negotiations.85
In light of the objective of promoting more transparency to the
public, this section also added a requirement for the USTR to
publish on its website “a detailed and comprehensive summary of
the specific objectives with respect to the negotiations and a
description of how the agreement, if successfully concluded, will
further those objectives and benefit the United States” at least thirty
days before initiating negotiations with a country upon consulting
with the revenue committees.86
This section also added
consultation requirements pertaining to trade in sensitive

82
83
84
85
86

USTR Consultation Guidelines, supra note 79, at 4-5.
19 U.S.C. § 4204 (2016).
19 U.S.C. § 4204(a)(1)(A) (2016).
Id. § 4204(c)(1).
Id. § 4204(a)(1)(D).
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industries, such as fishing and textiles.87 The combination of these
provisions enforces congressional oversight of the delegated powers
to a greater degree than it had been in the past.
iv. Section 4205: Implementation of Trade Agreements88
To implement any agreement, the president, in addition to
satisfying the notice and consultation requirement above, must do
the following. First, TPA-2015 adds another new requirement, that
the full text of a completed trade agreement be made public at least
sixty days before the president enters into the agreement on the
USTR website, giving citizens “new and unprecedented access and
knowledge . . . well before they are even submitted to Congress for
approval.”89 Also, the president must submit to Congress a draft
statement of any administrative action proposed to implement the
agreement, and a copy of the final legal text of the agreement, at
least thirty days before the president submits final documents after
entering into an agreement.90 These layers of requirements ensure
that the executive branch remains accountable to the public and to
Congress throughout the implementation process.
Finally, TPA-2015 explicitly places limitations on trade
authorities procedures when Congress finds lack of notice or
consultations. The existence of this limitation should discourage
any attempt by the executive branch to abuse the delegated
authority.91 Moreover, this section includes an action under which
the delegated authority can be withdrawn through “procedural
disapproval resolution,” defined in section 4205 (b)(1)(B) of TPA2015 as follows:
The term ‘procedural disapproval resolution’ means a resolution of either
House of Congress, the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is
as follows: ‘That the President has failed or refused to notify or consult
in accordance with the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and
Accountability Act of 2015 on negotiations with respect to
________________ and, therefore, the trade authorities procedures under
that Act shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect
to such trade agreement or agreements”, with the blank space being filled
with a description of the trade agreement or agreements with respect to
which the President is considered to have failed or refused to notify or

87

Id. § 4204(a)(2).
19 U.S.C. § 4205 (2016).
89
Sen. Orrin Hatch, Speech on the Senate floor (June 11, 2015), available at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-trade-promotion-authorityenhances-congress-role-in-trade) (last visited April 22, 2016).
90
19 U.S.C. § 4205(a)(1)(D)(i)-(ii) (2016).
91
Id. § 4205(b).
88
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consult.92

The grounds for finding that the president has “failed or refused
to notify or consult” in accordance with TPA-2015 are exhaustive
and concrete. Congress may exercise procedural disapproval if:
• The president has failed or refused to consult in accordance
with sections 4203 and 4204 and the requirements with
respect to negotiations or agreements;
• The consultation and transparency guidelines (under
section 4203) have not been developed or met with respect
to the negotiations or agreements;
• The president has not met with the House or Senate
Advisory Group on Negotiations when requested under
section 4203(c)(4) with respect to the negotiations or
agreements; or
• The agreements fail to make progress in achieving the
purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives expressed in
TPA-2015.93
These provisions are the “emergency brakes” available to
Congress for lack of notice or consultations with respect to the trade
agreements. The definition of the procedural disapproval resolution
language is strong, which indicates that Congress is willing to
enforce its conditions in exchange for the TPA. Thus, under the new
Legislation, failure to comply with any of these requirements in the
implementation procedure can cause the revocation of the TPA, or
worse yet, the failure of a potentially long-negotiated trade
agreement.
v. Potential Concerns That May Arise From TPA-2015.
In reality, the strengthened congressional oversight mechanism
may face potential challenges in the following ways. The first issue
is related to granting every member of Congress, as well as her staff
with proper security clearances, access to negotiating text.94 This
provision requires careful consideration as to who should be able to
access the negotiating text to ensure that the effective and timely
negotiation of agreements is not hampered by the involvment of
more officials than needed. A side effect of that is ensuring
confidentiality, which the USTR Guidelines list as an important
matter to comply with certain legal requirements.95 This is
92
93
94
95

Id. § 4205(b)(1)(B)(i).
Id. § 4205(b)(1)(B)(ii)(I)-(IV).
USTR Consultation Guidelines, supra note 79, at 4.
USTR Consultation Guidelines, supra note 79, at 10.
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significant, as the over-engagement of Congress might impede or
disincentivize the executive branch from meaningfully engaging
Congress.
Second, the Legislation calls for the establishment of a Chief
Transparency Officer within the USTR’s office, who would be
responsible for consulting with Congress on transparency policy,
coordinating transparency in trade negotiations, engaging and
assisting the public, and advising the USTR on transparency policy.96
Again, historical accounts have shown the importance of
transparency between the two branches, but the executive branch
may view this as an uncomfortable, and worse yet, an unwelcome
encroachment into its ability to negotiate. Some may complain
about the diminishing independence of agencies, a problem that
hampers their ability to negotiate with the necessary degree of
secrecy and autonomy. The legislative and executive branches must
balance their priorities and concerns to adhere to the procedural
requirements under TPA-2015, centering on their common
objective.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNS REGARDING CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT
In previous Parts, this Article has examined the historical
context and the progress of the congressional oversight mechanisms
integrated with the TPA. The significance of these developments
becomes clearer when weighed against the potential administrative
and constitutional ramifications when the TPA breaks down. This
Part argues that the conditions provided within TPA-2015 must be
strictly enforced, because if they are not, the legal and political
avenues available to Congress are arguably limited.
Scholars have argued that the procedural safeguards built
within the fast-track arrangement allow Congress to exercise
considerable influence over the conduct of trade negotiations.97
Unfortunately, these procedural safeguards may be as influential as
the proponents of the TPA may claim, based on the previous
practice of Congress and judicial decisions on legislative veto.
To summarize, the TPA allows Congress to safeguard the
delegated authority through three procedural means.98 First,
Congress can threaten to withhold negotiating authority unless the
96

USTR Consultation Guidelines, supra note 79, at 1.
Eugenia da Conceicao-Heldt, NEGOTIATING TRADE LIBERALIZATION
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND BARGAINING DYNAMICS 53 (2011).
98
Id.
97

AT THE
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president accepts the conditions imposed by the legislature.
Second, Congress can attempt to influence the negotiations while
they are under way by threatening to disapprove any agreement that
does not include aspects favorable to the views of Congress. Finally,
Congress ultimately would have a veto power—an up or down
vote—over the trade agreement negotiated by the USTR.99 Under
TPA-2015, the limitations on Trade Authorities Procedures have
been strengthened, as explained in the previous Part.
Political Disincentive to Vote “Down.” This conclusion is
supported by looking at Congress’s history with regard to trade
agreements and judicial treatment of the legislative veto. First,
Congress’s history with regard to trade agreements reveals that there
is no precedent where Congress actually voted down a trade
agreement because either the House or the Senate were displeased
with the consultation or negotiating processes. Even if either house
of Congress is unsatisfied with the president’s consultation and
reporting performance, it would be extremely difficult to exercise
congressional disapproval authority for two substantial reasons.
First, many members of Congress, as elected representatives with
political priorities that include creating jobs and expanding the
American economy through trade, may not want to vote down a
trade agreement if it has the strong prospect of increasing exports
and boosting the American economy.100 Even those opposed to the
TPA aspect of TPA-2015, including the Senate Majority Leader Harry
Reid and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, believe that free and
fair trade is good for Americans.101 So a member of Congress’s
disappointment with the consultation or negotiating processes used
by the president is unlikely to override that member’s desire to
support free trade. Second, voting down a trade agreement will
generate enormous strain in the diplomatic relations with the
negotiating countries, especially given how long and arduous many
of these negotiations can be. Therefore, even if TPA procedurally
guarantees a de facto veto power, its actual effectiveness is
questionable. And this political reality raises the question, what
99

Id.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Assessing the Record of America’s Trade Agreements
(Nov. 16, 2015), available at https://www.uschamber.com/issue-brief/assessing-therecord-america-s-trade-agreements (summarizing the historical impact of trade
agreements on the U.S. economy).
101
Vicki Needham, Pelosi Comes out Against Fast Track Bill, THE HILL (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/198297-pelosi-comes-out-against-fast-track-bill
(last visited on May 5, 2015) (citing Pelosi, “We’re the party of free trade, fair trade,
and we believe that the global economy is here to stay, and we’re part of it.”).
100

KIM FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

344

8/23/2016 11:12 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:2

would ensue if the TPA’s consultative mechanisms fail?
A. Evaluating the Efficacy of the TPA as an Ex-post Veto Power visà-vis INS v. Chadha
The withdrawal of expedited procedures in the TPA is a form of
ex-post veto power available to Congress. While this power appears
to be significant, it is undermined by the legislative reality and its
arguably weak legal legitimacy, judging by how the courts have
treated legislative veto. Procedurally, a Senate or House committee
has the ability to reverse fast-track procedures if the president fails
to meet the requirements for consultation with congressional
committees. In such a circumstance, fast-track procedures for
implementing bilateral or multilateral trade agreements may be
withdrawn.
To proceed with the withdrawal in the House, a resolution of
disapproval must be launched by the chair or by a member of the
Ways and Means or Rules Committees. If the process is initiated in
the Senate, it has to be introduced by the Finance Committee.102 As
gatekeeper committees, they are given the power to deny the TPA
application to trade agreements. Considering that the TPA is an
exercise of the House and Senate’s rulemaking power, from the
constitutional law perspective, it can be reversed at any time through
unicameral annulment.103
The existence of the ex-post veto power under the TPA should
be considered in the context of Congress’s prior practice of
legislative vetoes. Historically, the possibility of legislative vetoes
encouraged broad delegation of authority, as it gave room for
Congress to reject agreements it disliked.104 Under the TPA,
Congress is empowered by the ex post veto power, as one of the lastresort reins on the executive branch.
However, the constitutionality of the ex-post veto power under
the TPA remains unclear, as the Supreme Court sounded the death
knell for legislative vetoes in the landmark case, Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha.105 Although the decision could
have been based on the unique facts surrounding the particular
legislative veto, Chief Justice Burger wrote a very broad decision that

102
Susanne Lohmann & Sharyn O’Halloran, Divided Government and U.S. Trade
Policy: Theory and Evidence, 48 INT’L ORG. 595, 620 (1994).
103
DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION, supra note 37, at 5–7.
104
DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION, supra note 37, at 5–7.
105
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) [hereinafter Chadha].
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may invalidate all legislative vetoes in federal statutes.106
In Chadha, the Court declared unconstitutional a statutory
provision that authorized either House of Congress to reverse
decisions of the attorney general concerning whether or not to
deport aliens.107 In that particular case, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (“INS”) had ordered Mr. Jagdish Rai Chadha,
an East Indian, who was born in Kenya and held a British passport,
to be deported after an adjudicatory hearing.108 The attorney general
had suspended that order, and the House of Representatives had
reinstated it by vetoing the attorney general’s decision.109
In its majority decision, the Court found that congressional
procedural rules may be an exception to its holding, by noting that
it might be permissible “to accomplish what has been attempted by
one House of Congress in the case [where] action [is required] in
conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution’s
prescription for legislative action.”110 However, the Court also
limited the circumstances to which the foregoing exception to the
ban against legislative vetoes can be applied, as “narrow, explicit,
and separately justified.”111 In this regard, it is unclear whether the
withdrawal of expedited procedures under the TPA would satisfy
such a narrow exception if Congress were to exercise what can
essentially be interpreted as a legislative veto.
Although Chadha was a case involving an adjudicatory
decision, the Court quickly indicated that its decision deserves a
wide application by affirming two decisions by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, which had invalidated one and twohouse vetoes of agency rules, one of which is Consumer Energy
Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory, a D.C. Circuit case
decided per curiam.112

106
See Beth A. Honetschlager, Comment, Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha: The Death Knell for the Legislative Veto? 69 Iowa L. Rev. 513, 514 (1984).
107
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 920; 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1) (1976); Section 244(c)(1) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act provided, in part, “Upon application by any alien
who is found by the Attorney General to meet the requirements of subsection (a) of
this section the Attorney General may in his discretion suspend deportation of such
alien.” Id.
108
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 922.
109
Id. at 923-28.
110
Id. at 968.
111
Id. at 955.
112
Consumer Energy Council of Amer. v. Fed. Energy Regulation Commission, 673
F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff’d in Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy
Council of Amer., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
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Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC. In FERC, the D.C.
Circuit invalidated the one-house veto when it was used to review a
proposed Incremental Pricing Rule of the FERC. A group
representing residential customers supported FERC’s proposed rule
that would shift natural gas price increases to industrial customers.
The same day FERC issued the final rule, the Subcommittee on
Energy and Power reported favorably on a resolution of disapproval,
and the full committee did the same the next day. On the
constitutionality of the legislative veto, the D.C. Circuit stated:
Indeed, it is ironic that Congressional amici attempt to place great
significance on the Commission’s independence and on the need for
having a politically accountable check on the agency’s decision. The
fundamental justification for making agencies independent is that since they
exercise adjudicatory powers requiring impartial exercise, political interference
is undesirable (emphasis added).113

Relevance of these Cases to the TPA Withdrawal Mechanism. There
is a caveat to analogizing the TPA’s ex-post veto power with these
legislative veto cases. Under the TPA, fast-track authority is
delegated from Congress to the president, not to any independent
executive agencies, as seen in Chadha and FERC. Also, as examined
in Part I, ex-post veto power under the TPA is a part of a political
agreement between the executive branch and Congress. This means
it is a prescribed, predetermined contingency mechanism, which is
different from the way Congress exercised its veto in Chadha or
FERC. However, despite such differences, the jurisprudence that
heavily suggests that legislative vetoes are most likely all
unconstitutional is significant in evaluating the efficacy of the
congressional oversight mechanism embedded in the TPA.
The implications of the Chadha decision and the subsequent
FERC decision are substantial, as these cases switch the playing field
for Congress. In the words of Prof. Oona A. Hathaway, the Supreme
Court arguably “pulled away this last strand” of congressional
power over ex-ante congressional-executive agreements, with
Chadha, leaving behind the delegations of congressional authority
to the president without the potential of exercising its most
powerful legislative procedure in TPA-2015.114 Prof. Hathaway
observes, “when Congress responded to Chadha by simply removing
the legislative vetoes, it left in place broad delegations that Congress
never intended to leave unsupervised.”115 This potential for an
113

Id. at 472.
Oona Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance,
YALE L.J. 140, 254 (2009).
115
Hathaway, supra note 114 at 254 (explaining how to rethink delegations of
114
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imbalance of authority is also identified in the dissenting opinion
of Justice White in the Chadha decision:
Without the legislative veto, Congress is faced with a Hobson’s choice:
either to refrain from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself
with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover
endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the
alternative, to abdicate its law-making function to the executive branch
and independent agencies.116

The Court’s findings may be especially problematic when the
TPA is viewed as a delegation that must be carefully supervised.
Fueling this concern, the TPA is prone to the “Hobson’s choice”
described by Justice White, in which Congress cannot simply
“refrain from delegating the necessary authority” because once
granted, the TPA could be delegated for a long period of time, until
July 1, 2021, provided an extension disapproval resolution is not
introduced and passed by either chamber by July 1, 2018.117 The
question of how long fast-track authority can be given to the
president without an adequate mechanism to oversee the effect of
trade agreements was one of the major reasons for the congressional
refusal to renew fast-track authority in the past. For example, USTR
Kantor faced a particularly difficult battle for congressional approval
in the 1990s.118 During that time, the Senate Finance Committee
was very concerned about the problem of procedural controls,
although Congress mostly declined to grant fast-track authority on
substantive grounds (i.e., labor standards and environmental
provisions).119
B. Viability of Judicial Review: No Alternative Under Political
Question Doctrine
In light of the potential unconstitutionality of the withdrawal
procedures of the TPA, the rest of the congressional oversight
mechanisms under the TPA, such as consultation and reports, are all
the more crucial. Barring all the domestic and diplomatic
disincentives for Congress to actually exercise its ex-post veto power,
Congress will not be able to make a claim to the Court against the
executive branch, even if the president or his agents violate the
procedural requirement, as trade negotiation would be deemed a
lawmaking authority to the president).
116
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 968.
117
FERGUSSON, supra note 6, at 8.
118
Joyce Barrett, U.S. Trade Representative urges Fast-Track Extension, DAILY NEWSRECORD (May 18, 1995) available at https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G116884423.html.
119
See DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS, supra note 12, at 17–19.
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non-justiciable issue under the political question doctrine.
Under the political question doctrine, a court will decline to
rule on the merits if it finds that the underlying matter is committed
to the discretion and expertise of the legislative and executive
branches. Most notably for the purposes of this Article, Made in the
USA Foundation v. United States dealt with a challenge to the NAFTA,
in which it was alleged that the failure to use the treaty process
rendered the agreement and its implementing legislation
unconstitutional.120 The court held that “ruling on the policy merits
would require it to consider areas beyond its expertise.”121 In that
case, the court noted that the Treaty Clause did not set forth
circumstances under which its procedures must be followed when
approving international commercial agreements, and that
determining the “significance” of an international agreement would
force the court to make “policy judgments of the sort unsuited for
the judicial branch.”122
Most applicable to the hypothetical situation here is the court’s
discussion of the need for the nation to speak with uniformity in
the area of foreign affairs and commerce. In the court’s view, a
judicial order declaring the NAFTA invalid “could have a profoundly
negative effect on this nation’s economy and its ability to deal with
other foreign powers”; the court emphasized that such an order
would not only affect the validity of the NAFTA, but would
“potentially undermine every other major international commercial
agreement made over the [past half-century].”123 Importantly, the
court expressed the need for the judicial branch to remain impartial
when adjudicating between the Congress and the president.124
In light of such strong deference provided to the president
under the trade negotiating authority, and the political question
doctrine generally, it remains questionable whether Congress can
successfully seek a judicial remedy when it is unsatisfied with the
executive branch’s adherence to the procedural requirements of the
TPA.

120

Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1314 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
122
Id. at 1317. See also, CAROLYN C. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21004, TRADE
PROMOTION AUTHORITY AND FAST-TRACK NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS:
MAJOR VOTES, 6 (2011).
123
Made in the USA, 242 F.3d at 1268, 1312, 1318.
124
Id. at 1268.
121
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C. Going Forward: How to Evaluate TPA-2015
With the enactment of TPA-2015, the president and Congress
will test whether the enhanced oversight mechanisms effectively
achieve accountability and transparency, while trying to avoid the
pitfalls that occurred during the implementation of the 2002 Trade
Act. Though it is difficult to predict the effectiveness of the new
measures, with various mercurial factors such as presidential
transition and progress on negotiations involved, the TPA can, and
should be assessed on its procedural value of greater inter-branch
cooperation. Such an assessment would consider “the duration, the
scope, the precision of the negotiating direction given to the
president, and the mechanisms for withholding fast-track treatment
from a particular agreement.”125
Prof. Hal Shapiro and Lael Brainard have introduced two
alternative forms of the TPA, which are beneficial in contemplating
both potential advantages and disadvantages of each model. On
one end of the spectrum, they present a notion of making each grant
of authority “specific to the negotiation of a particular agreement
and the duration coterminous with the length of the negotiation,”
or a case-by-case TPA.126 The advantage of a case-by-case TPA is that
it would permit much more precision in the negotiating objectives,
and allow Congress to confine debate to the potential merits of a
particular trade agreement. In the current context, Congress could
grant the TPA for the negotiation with the E.U. in TTIP, but refuse it
for implementing the TPP. The problem with this approach,
however, is that it may prove overly restrictive, unintentionally
signaling to international counterparts that the president does not
have the authority to enter into any negotiations until after
congressional approval has been obtained.127 However, with such a
variety of trade agreements on the table, future Congresses may find
this to be an ideal option to ensure its involvement in the
negotiating process without being bound to the binary “up-ordown” vote.
The opposite approach is Congress establishing fast-track
procedural mechanisms “for a longer duration or even indefinitely,
but requiring an additional hurdle for the application of the

125

Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard, Fast Track Promotion Authority, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION (Dec. 1, 2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/
papers/2001/12/globaleconomics-brainard.
126
Id.
127
Id.
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procedures to a particular agreement.”128 I call this option a
proportional TPA. According to Shapiro and Brainard, the president
would be pushed to “consult Congress at the start of (or early in)
negotiations, and it would permit Congress to establish more
specific negotiating objectives for each agreement than is possible
in previous fast-track legislation.”129 The advantage in this model is
that if the TPA is granted, Congress could further specify whether
the application to a specific agreement would require a vote by only
the gatekeeper committees or a more difficult floor action, and
whether it would require a vote of approval or the easier standard
of withstanding possible congressional disapproval.
Shapiro and Brainard additionally suggest that the “degree of
congressional oversight afforded by the hurdle for application to
particular trade negotiations could be made directly proportional to
the overarching authority granted to the President by Congress.”130
In other words, this proportional approach can potentially allow the
longer and broader trade negotiations to receive more oversight.
Although this appears to be a convincing solution in theory, the
trade agreements currently being negotiated can all make a
meritorious claim, to a degree, of their significance in the
international trading system. More importantly, it can defeat the
entire advantage of expedience in curtailing the legislative process,
which may eliminate the political incentive of the president to seek
the TPA.
Prof. Hathaway’s recommendation precisely addresses these
administrative and political concerns. She suggests that if Congress
authorizes the TPA on a periodic basis, it could better ensure that
the authority is not abused.131 A president who uses the authority
in ways that are regarded by Congress as abusive would see the
authority disappear shortly thereafter. In her view, that potential
withdrawal would provide an incentive for the president to
communicate effectively with Congress and to use the fast-track
authority in a responsible and judicious manner.132
While the periodic review is one way of ensuring the
congressional delegation does not go unaccounted for, the 2007
GAO Report shows that absent proper cooperation, the most
128

Id.
Id.
130
Id.
131
Hathaway, supra note 114, at 265 (discussing advantageous aspects of adopting
a fast track process for trade negotiations).
132
Hathaway, supra note 114, at 264.
129
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comprehensive consultation and monitoring requirements can be
futile. Many interviewed political staff did not even know what the
COG was, nor what role it was supposed to carry out. If the political
and legal concerns of the TPA are not hashed out through more
comprehensive and workable congressional oversight mechanisms,
Congress may have decreasing leverage in including terms for its
desired level of involvement in the future.
This observation circles back to the reality that the difficulty lies
in the implementation phase, and Congress must reinforce adhering
to statutory representation requirements without disincentivizing
the executive branch from meaningfully engaging with Congress. It
is an important means for Congress to “not only keep tabs on the
negotiations through the President, but also to be present and active
in negotiations.”133 With this in mind, Congress must decide
whether the current form of the TPA satisfies its legislative objectives
during the next five years. Another non-legal avenue Congress may
pursue in motivating executive compliance would be mobilizing
constituents to urge the executive for more transparency and greater
involvement of Congress through the TPA mechanism. As
examined above, TPA-2015 includes the unprecedented notice to
the public requirement even before seeking congressional approval
of the negotiated text. Given the precarious political nature of the
TPA, the president and his executive agencies will improve
information access and the timeliness of congressional
consultations, if there are political pressures for them to make this
available.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article examined the congressional oversight mechanisms
of the Trade Promotion Authority, from its creation to the most
recent version contained in TPA-2015. It first introduced the
evolution of fast-track authority and examined how this
congressional-executive agreement is a unique creation of the
United States. As seen through various trade legislation, the power
struggle between the executive branch and Congress necessitates
133

Laure L. Wright, Trade Promotion Authority: Fast Track for the Twenty-First Century?,
12 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 979, 1003 (2004); see also, Christopher S. Rugaber, Trade
Policy: Baucus, Other Senators Press Zoellick on Trade Consultation Issues, 19 INT’L TRADE
REP. 1901, 1901 (2002) (stating that “designated congressional trade advisers and their
staff should be able to attend and observe trade negotiations, and . . . should have
access to negotiating documents, with sufficient opportunity to comment on them . . . .
[T]here should be enough time for reasonable congressional suggestions to be
incorporated into U.S. negotiating positions.”).

KIM FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

352

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

8/23/2016 11:12 PM

[Vol. 40:2

clear procedures and congressional oversight mechanisms that will
ensure that Congress’s delegated authority does not end in the
executive branch’s unfettered authority without proper consultative
process. Congress has continued to expand and clarify the oversight
mechanism that mandates executive-congressional consultation, as
demonstrated by the Trade Act of 2002 and after a long hiatus, it
was revived and strengthened in TPA-2015.
The importance of a proper consultation mechanism is
especially heightened given the unwillingness of some members of
Congress to vote down trade deals and the doubtful
constitutionality of the ex-post veto power of Congress. With such
meager political and judicial recourse available, Congress must
remain vigilant and ensure proper balance between itself and the
executive branch.
The executive branch also has greater
responsibility under TPA-2015, in notifying, briefing, and
consulting various stakeholders in the public and private spheres.
This can be achieved when both the executive branch and Congress
dedicate themselves to adhering to the procedural aspect of the TPA
and engage in a frank dialogue in a timely manner.
As it stands currently, the efficacy of TPA-2015 remains
undetermined, but the USTR’s release of the Consultation
Guidelines is a good start. Crucially, TPA-2015’s effectiveness and
relevance will be evaluated based on how the next president sets the
trade negotiating objectives and strategies, which in turn, will
determine how the president exercises the TPA. Considering the
significance of pending PTAs, such as the TPP and the TTIP,
Congress must maximize its role in congressional oversight to make
certain that the direction of the executive branch remains in line
with the general will of Congress. As President Nixon stated in his
speech in 1973, trade policy is a field that requires significant
collaboration between the two branches of the government. Almost
half a century later, his words still ring true, and such inter-branch
cooperation remains an important goal for the 114th Congress,
President Obama, and his successor, for the determination of future
U.S. trade policy.

